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‘The Other End of a Trajectory’: 
Operation Backfire and the German Origins of Britain’s Ballistic Missile 
Programme 
Dr Charlie Hall (University of Kent) 
 
Abstract 
The ballistic missile age dawned in September 1944, when Nazi Germany began its V-2 
campaign against Britain and Western Europe. One year later, in October 1945, the British 
launched a V-2 rocket themselves, as the culmination of Operation Backfire. This article will 
chart Britain’s development of a guided missile capacity in the years immediately following 
the Second World War, and the importance of German expertise therein. It will also explore 
how this transnational process occurred within a broader international context, especially the 
reconfiguration of the Anglo-American relationship and the growing threat of the Soviet 
Union. As such it will show how swiftly the Cold War arms race emerged from the ashes of 
the previous conflict, how technology and international relations are intimately entwined, 
and how Britain was an active and enthusiastic participant in the very earliest days of the 
missile age. 
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On 8 September 1944, at around 6:45pm, a V-2 rocket landed in Staveley Road, Chiswick, 
killing three people and doing considerable damage to nearby properties.1 This was only the 
second V-2 rocket (also known as the A.4) to be launched operationally, and the first to kill 
on impact.2 As such, Britain became the first nation to suffer casualties as the result of a 
ballistic missile attack.3 On 2 October 1945, once the Second World War had ended in both 
Europe and Asia, the British launched a V-2 themselves, under experimental conditions. 
Therefore, in a little over twelve months, Britain went from being a victim of long-range 
guided missiles to a wielder of this impressive new military technology. However, that is not 
the whole story. By 1948, Britain had decided not to pursue the development of an 
independent long-range rocket capacity any further, instead choosing to focus on jet-
powered, piloted bombers as the preferred method of delivery for conventional, and later 
atomic, payloads.4 As a result, most accounts of Britain’s missile programme begin with the 
initial (and ultimately abortive) development of the Blue Streak rocket in 1955, and the initial 
post-war efforts are largely forgotten.5 
 This article has three main objectives, the first of which is to challenge this 
conventional but incomplete narrative. While it may make sense in the form of a 
retrospective overview, only picking up the story with the first clearly-defined British missile 
project in the mid-1950s ignores the contemporary perspectives of the relevant officials and 
policymakers at the end of the Second World War, who very much saw themselves as active 
participants in the newly-dawned missile age. In particular, this account will emphasise a key 
principle which served to guide policy in the immediate post-war period – that atomic 
weapons would shape any future conflict and that the most effective delivery method for 
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nuclear warheads would likely be long-range ballistic missiles.6 Furthermore, most histories 
of this topic also fail to mention another key principle which influenced early British plans for 
an independent missile programme – the assumption that the quickest and easiest way for 
Britain to obtain a missile capacity of its own would be to draw upon German technology and 
expertise once the Third Reich had collapsed.7 It is the second objective of this article to 
combat this omission, to locate German contributions to this process, and thus to reframe 
the story as a transnational, rather than solely Anglo-centric, one. 
With these first two objectives in mind, this article aims to show that, from the last 
months of the war until the independent missile programme was dropped in 1948, Britain 
saw itself as an active and significant competitor in the new international missile race, and 
believed that its chances of success hinged on the effective utilisation of German equipment 
and know-how. In this way, Operation Backfire – the assembly, preparation and firing of three 
V-2 rockets, by experienced German staff under British supervision and observation, in 
October 1945 – can be seen as a critical moment in Britain’s first foray into missile 
development. Some histories of this subject have dismissed the results of Backfire as ‘limited 
and of little practical value’, but those involved in the operation certainly did not see it that 
way.8 The official Backfire report noted that all relevant British Ministries ‘were unanimous 
that it was most desirable to carry out such an operation’, based on the widely-held view 
‘that it might save years of development work’.9 
 Naturally, all of this took place against the global backdrop of worsening relations 
between East and West and the increasing hostility and suspicion of the nascent Cold War.10 
Indeed, in the official predictions of future conflict which highlighted the importance of long-
range rockets, the envisaged enemy was always the Soviet Union. The crucial requirement 
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for the most powerful of the ballistic missiles desired by Britain was that it would be able to 
hit targets in western Russia, if launched from the United Kingdom or from overseas bases in 
Cyprus or India.11 The third objective of this article, though, is to show that the USSR was not 
the only foreign adversary which Britain faced in its drive to build up a missile capacity after 
the Second World War, especially in the first year or so after the conflict. Instead, it soon 
found itself entangled in a fierce rivalry with its closest wartime ally, the United States. Both 
countries (as well as the other occupiers of Germany, France and the Soviet Union) sought to 
make use of German expertise to build up a domestic missile arsenal but the greater 
resources and newly-minted superpower status of the US allowed them to essentially 
steamroll over their transatlantic allies. As such, the competition for the best assets of the 
German rocketry programme (both material and personnel) provided the British with an early 
and rather brutal realisation that they were no longer at the very top table of global politics 
and that they might have to be prepared to play second fiddle to the Americans moving 
forward.12 
 Once again, Operation Backfire proved a particularly sensitive flashpoint, especially 
when the US authorities withdrew their support for what had started out as an Anglo-
American undertaking and then threatened to scupper the whole initiative by demanding the 
removal of several of the most prominent German engineers involved. It is, therefore, the 
intention of this article to use a close examination of Operation Backfire and the period 
immediately surrounding it to achieve the three stated objectives. Put simply, it will show 
that for a brief time after the Second World War, Britain was fully committed to developing 
an independent missile capability, that it identified the utilisation of German expertise as vital 
to attaining this goal, and that the greatest threat posed to this scheme came from American 
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intransigence and overriding self-interest. This short chapter of history can therefore tell us 
a remarkable amount about Britain, its views on new military technologies, and its relations 
with other countries, in the earliest part of the Cold War. 
 
The Rocket Threat 
Throughout the 1930s, as the threat of another European war loomed ever larger, much time 
and effort was expended by people of all stripes, from novelists to civil servants, attempting 
to imagine what the next war would look like. In nearly all cases, the expectation was that it 
would be fought to a considerable, perhaps even overwhelming, extent, in the air. The fear 
of the bomber dominated civilian life, especially after the establishment of an Air Raid 
Precautions Department in 1935 and the distribution of gas masks during the Sudeten Crisis 
of 1938. Throughout, the idea of the ‘knock-out blow’ from the air maintained a central place 
in strategic predictions, even after the limitations of aerial bombardment had been exposed 
during the Spanish Civil War.13 In all of these calculations, the place of the long-range rocket 
or flying bomb remained peripheral at best. The threat of these untested and essentially 
hypothetical weapons paled in comparison to that of fleets of manned bombers delivering 
massive devastation to cities with impunity. When war broke out in 1939, these assumptions 
proved largely correct. While the ‘knock-out blow’ never materialised, aerial bombardment 
played a key part in the Nazi military campaigns of 1939-40 and was later utilised during the 
Blitz to try and bomb Britain into submission. The long-range rocket was nowhere to be seen. 
 Nevertheless, it did not entirely disappear from the minds of military strategists and 
intelligence experts. The Nazi menace was seen to be closely entwined with scientific and 
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technological innovation. Less than three weeks after the outbreak of war, Adolf Hitler gave 
a speech in Danzig in which he boasted: ‘the moment might very quickly come for us to use 
a weapon with which we could not be attacked’.14 Among more ludicrous assessments of 
what exactly Hitler could be referring to (such as ‘death rays’), was the possibility of long-
range guided ballistic missiles.15 However, long-range rocketry actually received very little 
attention in the first years of the war. There were far more pressing concerns and the threat 
posed by some speculative weapon based on an entirely experimental and unproven 
technology did not seem to warrant the expenditure of much effort. This was compounded 
by a certain arrogance which possessed British military thinkers at this time – that if Britain 
had not developed a certain new type of weapon, then no other country could have done so 
either – and this particularly clouded notions of rocketry.16 
Indeed, from the start of the war, British research and development on rockets was 
relatively minor and was deliberately limited to short-range weapons, mostly to be used in 
an anti-aircraft capacity – long-range missiles were hardly even considered.17 Matters 
changed rather dramatically in the spring of 1943. In March, two German generals – Wilhelm 
Ritter von Thoma and Ludwig Crüwell – who were being held at the prisoner-of-war (POW) 
camp at Trent Park, north of London, were recorded (without their knowledge) discussing the 
German rocket programme, with von Thoma even expressing surprise that the long-range 
missile bombardment of Britain had not yet begun.18 This confirmed the tentative conclusions 
of earlier intelligence work and prompted intelligence officers to review aerial 
reconnaissance photographs taken of the Peenemünde area on the Baltic coast (where 
German rocketry research was primarily based) in May 1942, as well as more recent images. 
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As such, a clearer picture of German work on long-range rockets (and later also on flying 
bombs) began to emerge.19 
 From this point on, British investigations into German rocketry expanded and 
accelerated considerably. On 11 April 1943, the Chiefs of Staff received a report from the Vice 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Archibald Nye, which gave a summary of existing 
intelligence on the long-range rocket threat. This report predicted, amongst other things, that 
‘each rocket might carry an amount of explosive at least equal to that carried by the German 
1000kg bomb’, that ‘the extreme range would seem to be about 130 miles’, and that ‘an 
attack could fall without any warning’. While not all the details in Nye’s report were accurate, 
it had the desired effect and senior policymakers responded to his call to action: ‘Even though 
we have no proof or even indication of action to employ these rockets against us, so far, it is 
considered that the indications are sufficient to justify taking certain actions in view of the 
powerful moral and surprise effect of such weapons.’20 Four days later, General Hastings 
Ismay, Winston Churchill’s chief military advisor, relayed the thoughts of the Chiefs of Staff 
to the Prime Minister. They were ‘of the opinion that no time should be lost in establishing 
the facts and, if the evidence proves reliable, in devising counter-measures’, and 
recommended Duncan Sandys, Member of Parliament for Norwood, Financial Secretary to 
the War Office, and Churchill’s son-in-law, to head the investigative committee. Churchill 
signalled his agreement by scribbling ‘so proceed’ at the bottom of the memo.21  
 Under Sandys’ leadership, the so-called Crossbow Committee worked tirelessly to 
gather intelligence on the rocket threat, and to try and find ways to counter it. Their work 
became increasingly vital as the tide of war turned in favour of the Allies and fears grew of a 
new German secret weapon which could theoretically undo their hard-earned progress. In 
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December 1943, the Chiefs of Staff worried that if rockets were used against port facilities in 
southern England before the summer of 1944, it could seriously jeopardise Operation 
Overlord, the planned Allied invasion of Europe.22 Indeed, after the war, Dwight Eisenhower, 
the commander responsible for Overlord, wrote that ‘if the German [sic] had succeeded in 
perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of 
Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.’23 The issue was 
perhaps best expressed by the military head of the German V-2 project, Lieutenant-General 
Walter Dornberger, in his post-war memoir: ‘Only one thing can be said with absolute 
certainty: the use of the V-2 may be aptly summed up in the two words: “too late”.’24 
 Of course, this appraisal is only possible in hindsight and the fact that the V-2s would 
go on to have only a limited impact on the course of the war was cold comfort to the citizens 
of London (and Paris and Antwerp) when the rocket bombardment began in September 1944. 
Over the next seven months, some 1,115 V-2 rockets fell on Britain, resulting in 2,855 
fatalities. In addition, 20,000 houses were destroyed and a further 580,000 were damaged. 
When compared with the impact of conventional bombing during the Blitz, which claimed 
the lives of over 51,000 Britons, and with the preceding and simultaneous V-1 attacks, which 
killed 6,184 people, these statistics seem somewhat less impressive.25 In terms of morale, the 
effect is harder to judge – some responded to this new threat with little more than disinterest, 
confident that it would soon be eradicated by the advancing Allied armies, while others found 
the prospect of an explosive arriving without warning (as it travelled faster than the speed of 
sound) truly terrifying.26 The Allied leadership were not unduly worried that this new weapon 
would turn the tide of war against them but, taken with the contemporaneous failure of 
Operation Market Garden and other German technological advances, such as jet aircraft and 
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the submarine Schnorkel system, the start of the V-2 campaign did cause a slight dent in the 
British belief that the end of the war was in sight in the autumn of 1944.27 Moreover, the 
British preoccupation with rocketry during this period was not only about looking for a way 
to neutralise this technology, but also seeking to obtain it for their own use. 
Looking at the other side of the story, it has been argued, relatively fairly, that the V-
2 was a poor use of resources for the Third Reich, as it was extremely costly to produce while 
its impact was relatively small. The money diverted to the long-range rocket programme 
would perhaps have been far better spent on anti-aircraft defences and fighter production, 
though in the latter case there was a severe shortage of fuel as well as aircraft.28 That said, 
Hitler and the Nazi leadership felt they needed to offer a visible response to the enormous 
and almost ceaseless Allied aerial bombardment of Germany (hence the designation of 
‘vengeance weapons’) and to give the German people hope that the fortunes of the war could 
be turned by these new technological marvels. The generally unimpressive record of the V-2 
during the war presents an interesting paradox – if long-range rockets were such an 
ineffective weapon, why did all the victorious Allies rush to gather German technology and 
expertise in this field once the war had ended? The answer can be summarised in a single 
word: potential. As the British Director of Guided Projectiles, Sir Alwyn Crow, put it: ‘as might 
be expected, the first two weapons [the V-1 and V-2] are crude’, but, he went on, ‘further 
development may be expected considerably to improve the accuracy, to simplify the use and 
to increase the applications.’29 In short, the V-2 was the primitive prototype for a new era in 
which much more advanced missiles, equipped with more sophisticated guidance systems 
and armed with more powerful (perhaps nuclear) payloads, would decisively shape the future 
of warfare.30 
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British military planners certainly internalised this notion. On 16 June 1945, with the 
war in the Pacific still ongoing, a committee, headed by the esteemed chemist and senior 
British military science advisor, Sir Henry Tizard, and acting under the instruction of the British 
Chiefs of Staff, produced a report entitled ‘Future Development in Weapons and Methods of 
War’. On the subject of rockets, the so-called Tizard Report noted that: ‘In its most 
revolutionary form, that of long-range rocket bombardment, the rocket has appeared too 
late to have a decisive effect. In all its forms, we believe that its use will be of great 
significance in a future war.’ It even went on to speculate that ‘it may contribute to render 
the “strategic bomber” obsolete’.31 Even as early as November 1944, Duncan Sandys, who 
knew perhaps more about the nature of the V-2 than anyone else in Britain, predicted that 
‘in future, the possession of superiority in long distance rocket artillery may well count for 
nearly as much as superiority in naval or air power.’32 This thinking motivated the British, as 
well as the other Allies, to try and learn as much as they could about German rocketry – the 
expertise of their former enemy was seen as a vital shortcut to achieving their own post-war 
technological superiority. 
In fact, this attitude did not merely apply to rocketry. In the last year of the war, and 
even more so once it had ended, all the Allies embarked on major schemes to exploit the 
science and technology of the Third Reich.33 From the very beginning of this initiative, 
however, rocketry occupied a particularly important place in Allied exploitation and any 
material or personnel pertaining to this highly important field were considered to be among 
the most valuable spoils of war. British exploitation of German science and technology began 
on an Anglo-American basis, under the auspices of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-
Committee (CIOS).34 When this organisation first drew up its ‘Black List’ of high-priority topics 
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in August 1944, ‘rockets’ were the fourth item on the list.35 Ten days later, the first team of 
CIOS investigators travelled to Europe, arriving in Paris just three days after it had been 
liberated. The first report which they sent back to the London headquarters was entitled 
‘Radar and Guided Missiles’ and detailed work which had been done on these subjects by 
French experts and in French facilities during the German occupation.36 Then, in November, 
CIOS operatives travelled to the Netherlands to gather intelligence on V-2 launching 
procedure, a task which was motivated as much by the need to prevent the rockets raining 
down on London as it was by the desire to learn more about this new technology. In the 
course of these investigations, CIOS agents were told by a Dutch Resistance fighter that one 
German soldier died of severe burns for each V-2 that was launched and that some of the 
warheads used contained anthrax. These strange and ultimately false claims give some sense 
of the rumour and conjecture with which exploitation investigators had to contend when 
researching rocketry.37 The British demand for knowledge on missiles continued into early 
1945 – in February, Colonel Terence Sanders of the Ministry of Supply led a four-man mission 
to northern France to investigate the seven so-called ‘heavy’ V-2 launch sites located there.38 
Once the borders of the Third Reich were breached in the early part of 1945, the real 
spoils of war became available to Allied exploitation teams, who continued to operate under 
the Anglo-American auspices of CIOS in London and the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the field. On 22 April, Colonel Holger Toftoy of the US 
Ordnance Department reported that Allied troops had captured ‘two trainloads of 
substantially complete V-2 German long-range rockets’, as well as ‘a third trainload of 
warheads and fuses’. With palpable excitement, Toftoy noted that ‘the capture of these 
rockets is of considerable interest and importance, since this is the first time that undamaged 
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specimens have been recovered and an opportunity afforded for their examination’, and 
stated his belief that ‘this capture will result in a considerably improved knowledge of the 
rockets’.39 Less than two weeks later, SHAEF issued a directive to all Army Groups and Air 
Forces operating in the European theatre; it stated: ‘Immediate steps will … be taken to 
ensure that all captured V-2s, associated launching and control equipment are carefully 
preserved for examinations and possible future use, and are not tampered with in any way. 
Captured V-2 launching crews and technical personnel will be kept together and not disposed 
of until clearance is obtained [from this Headquarters].’40 It is clear therefore that 
investigations into German long-range rocketry were a top priority for the British and 
Americans, even while the war was still being fought. The next step was to decide how best 




The origins of Operation Backfire lay in a memorandum prepared by Eisenhower, as the head 
of SHAEF, and transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (of Britain and the US) on 15 May 
1945, exactly one week after the German surrender. It suggested the value to the Allies of a 
firing trial of captured V-2s and justified it in the following terms: 
a) Such a trial would save many years of development work by Allies and enable us to “cash 
in” on the years of work which the Germans have devoted to this development; 
b) The firing of captured V-2s now would ensure that no vital piece of equipment or operation 
is kept from our knowledge; 
Charlie Hall ‘The Other End of a Trajectory’ November 2019 
14 
 
c) The launching and control of rockets is a complicated and intricate process and unless we 
get enemy technicians to demonstrate their technique now their skill will deteriorate and 
before long will be lost to us. Delays which would be caused by moving personnel and 
equipment out of theatre therefore not acceptable.41 
It went on to stipulate that any such trials would be held under SHAEF auspices as they were 
of equal interest to both the British and the Americans, that approximately 30 rockets would 
be fired, and that the results of the firings would be appropriately collated and made available 
to both countries.42 The British Chiefs of Staff considered this memo over the next two days 
and then asked the War Office to investigate further.43 Two days later, under pressure from 
the US Chiefs of Staff to give their assent, they requested further information on the number 
of complete V-2s available in Germany, stating that ‘it is obviously undesirable that all or even 
almost all available should be expended during [the] proposed trial.’ Both Britain and the US 
had requested 100 each and there were ‘other claimants’ (presumably the Soviets and the 
French).44 Reassured that Eisenhower ‘has at least 300, and possibly as many as 500, rockets 
in his possession’ and that he ‘only visualises using 30 rockets in the trials’, the Chiefs of Staff 
signalled their approval for Backfire to go ahead on 24 May 1945.45 
 With the full backing of the relevant authorities in both London and Washington, DC, 
Operation Backfire began in earnest. Eisenhower named Major-General Alexander Cameron, 
the Chief of Air Defence for SHAEF, as the head of the new Special Projectile Operations Group 
(SPOG), responsible for Backfire, and an establishment of some 100 officers and 900 other 
ranks was agreed. The site chosen for the test launches was the Altenwalde Naval Gun Testing 
Ground of the German armament manufacturers, Krupp, near Cuxhaven in Lower Saxony, on 
the North Sea coast at the mouth of the River Elbe.46 The specific objective of the operation, 
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as dictated to Cameron, was ‘to obtain, while the German technical staff originally employed 
on long range rockets are still available and the details are still fresh in their minds: (a) 
information on the testing, assembly and filling of the German A.4 rocket; (b) detailed 
knowledge and experience of the German technique for launching long range rockets.’47 It 
was perhaps put best by one of the German experts involved, Dieter K. Huzel, who described 
it as ‘an effort to become familiar with the other end of a trajectory’.48 
Throughout the summer of 1945, work was undertaken at Cuxhaven to gather and 
record all knowledge and expertise on the V-2, and to prepare for the test-firings later in the 
year. By the end of August, SPOG was drawing on the services of over 600 German personnel 
– 79 technicians (49 of whom were working in the various workshops at the test site, while 
another 30 served as consultants), 120 military mechanics, and 414 unskilled POWs.49 The 
military commander of the German V-2 programme, Lieutenant-General Walter Dornberger, 
was also separately detained nearby for the purposes of interrogation.50 The British would 
later plan to try him on a war crimes basis for his role in the indiscriminate rocket bombing of 
London, but this flimsy and rather hypocritical case unsurprisingly came to nothing, though 
Dornberger did spend almost two years in a Welsh POW camp.51 Despite a few obstacles 
along the way, not least the poor condition of many of the rocket components which had to 
be salvaged from ditches and railway sidings, Operation Backfire concluded successfully in 
October 1945. While thirty launches had been planned, only three took place – the first, on 2 
October, was a great success: ‘The behaviour of the rocket from the moment of take-off to 
the point of fall was perfect’. The second, two days later, was a failure, with the rocket 
crashing almost immediately into the sea. The third and final launch took place on 15 October, 
‘as a demonstration to representatives from the United States, Russia, France, the Dominions, 
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Whitehall, and the Press’, and, despite poor weather conditions, was generally successful.52 
Three days later, it was agreed that Backfire could now be terminated, and the dissolution 
date was set for 30 November.53 
As this shows, Backfire ended up as a relatively small operation and certainly did not 
match some of the lofty ambitions that accompanied its initial establishment. In large part, 
this can be attributed to the breakdown in Anglo-American relations which took place during 
the summer of 1945 and from which Backfire suffered especially acutely. After the United 
States’ entry into the war in December 1941, the British and Americans had worked 
increasingly closely on almost all aspects of the war effort, their shared identity and purpose 
even seeming to erode traditional state sovereignty on occasion.54 Scientific and 
technological collaboration had long been a cornerstone of this alliance, as shown by the 
Tizard Mission (headed by the aforementioned Sir Henry Tizard) which saw an unprecedented 
sharing of military scientific secrets between the two countries in 1940, even before they 
became formal allies.55 One device which Tizard took with him as a gift for the Americans was 
a cavity magnetron (vital for airborne radar) which one American expert later described as 
‘the most valuable cargo ever brought to our shores’.56 An even clearer example would be the 
Manhattan Project – the Allied atomic bomb project which was based in, and resourced by, 
the United States, but which utilised some British expertise, and which was widely 
acknowledged at the time to have been a combined effort, at least in part.57 
But, by the time the war ended, the United States had emerged as one of only two 
global superpowers while Britain was a near-bankrupt empire, retaining some of its pre-war 
influence and international reach, but nevertheless clearly in decline; they were no longer 
equal partners and the nature of their relationship had to be renegotiated.58 This was 
Charlie Hall ‘The Other End of a Trajectory’ November 2019 
17 
 
manifested in a variety of ways, including the abrupt termination of the wartime Lend-Lease 
economic aid programme in August 1945 (and its replacement with a much less generous 
loan) and Britain’s increasing post-war dependence on international alliances, especially with 
the US, to defend its global interests, as seen with the creation of NATO in 1949.59 Another 
indication was the end of scientific collaboration, as shown in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Memorandum No.5, issued in May 1945, which stated that ‘technical information involving 
research and development projects, the application of which are incapable of being 
introduced in the present war, shall not be released [to foreign governments]’.60 This attitude 
was reinforced even more firmly in the field of atomic physics, despite the earlier 
collaboration of the Manhattan Project – in August 1946, the US Congress passed the 
McMahon Act which prohibited the sharing of American atomic secrets with any foreign 
power, including Britain.61 
The ramifications of this split were felt on the ground in Germany too. On 13 July 1945, 
SHAEF was liquidated and, from that point on, practically all British and American activities in 
occupied Germany, including the exploitation of German science and technology, were 
conducted on a unilateral basis (though co-operation did not entirely evaporate). In terms of 
Backfire, this new relationship manifested itself first in growing American disinterest in the 
operation, not least because it was seen as inferior to longer-term rocket research projects, 
also utilising German equipment and expertise, which had by then been initiated in the United 
States. Indeed, even as early as 4 June, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General George C. 
Marshall, wrote to Eisenhower to make it clear that ‘these firings must not interfere with [the] 
important US program.’62 The process of US withdrawal did, however, begin gradually – a 
week after SHAEF had been disbanded, responsibility for Backfire was passed over to the 
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British War Office but Cameron was informed that the ‘United States representative will 
participate on an equal basis at these firings and concurrence of United States authorities 
concerning the programme for such firings will be obtained. United States and United 
Kingdom will each have full access to the results obtained from such trial firings.’63 
However, despite this stated intention to continue working in close collaboration, the 
US immediately began to treat Backfire as a nuisance and an obstacle, rather than an integral 
part of broader Anglo-American strategy. In early August, Cameron wrote to his superior, the 
Director of Royal Artillery, Lieutenant-General Otto Marling Lund, with this ominous message: 
‘I think I should warn you that a crisis is boiling up in the affairs of Backfire. I had a visit today 
from Colonel Toftoy of the US Ordnance Dept., who is now in charge of all the rocket 
development in the States. He says that he needs 27 of the German civilians I am using here.’64 
On this point, Cameron was quite correct – the tug-of-war which developed over these 
German experts did come to resemble a full crisis, and it served to highlight how quickly 
Anglo-American co-operation had been replaced by bitter, and ultimately petty, competition. 
To summarise, most of Germany’s truly exceptional rocketry experts had ended up in 
American hands at the end of the war, and were detained at a US facility in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, in southern Bavaria. Eighty-five of these specialists had been ‘loaned’ by the 
US authorities to SPOG for Backfire but then, when the US launched Operation Overcast (a 
scheme to bring German rocket engineers to the United States for work on the American 
missile programme), these men were recalled as a matter of urgency. In a gesture of friendly 
spirit, the Americans only pushed for the return of 27 of these experts, those considered to 
have the highest scientific qualifications. The British agreed to return 15, but insisted that 
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they be allowed to retain the remaining 12 as they were considered of critical importance to 
the execution of Backfire.65 
The diplomatic wrangling over these 12 individuals continued for some time, with 
messages regularly crossing the Atlantic in an increasingly heated exchange – each side 
insisting that they were being more co-operative than the other while also fervently stating 
their case. The US argued that Backfire was ‘limited to the assembly and launching of V-2 
rockets rather than to their research and development aspects’ and therefore that alternates 
could easily be found for the 12 men in question.66 The British, on the other hand, made their 
case as follows: 
If the Japanese War had still been in progress, and if it had been shown that the presence of 
these 12 scientists in the USA was vital for the defeat of Japan, no difficulties would have been 
raised as regards their despatch to the USA but it must be assumed … that their employment 
in America can only be in connection with a long-term research project. Under these 
circumstances we cannot believe that their retention at Cuxhaven for what would probably 
be a maximum of 2 months, could seriously inconvenience the United States Chiefs of Staff, 
whereas their withdrawal at this juncture would prejudice the success of Backfire into which 
much hard work and valuable effort has been put.67 
In addition, the British authorities attributed much of the friction to ‘the mysterious and 
rather parochial way in which it pleased US Ordnance to work’.68 Nonetheless, a solution was 
eventually worked out between the British Director of Guided Projectiles, Alwyn Crow, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. Williams of US Ordnance – the British would return 15 of the 27 
experts immediately, and the remaining 12 as soon as Backfire was concluded. Despite this 
basically being exactly what the British had wanted in the first place, they also managed to 
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secure a sweetener to the deal – the Americans would lend them four of the most prominent 
German rocket engineers who were not at Cuxhaven, including their de facto leader, Wernher 
von Braun, for one week for detailed interrogation in London.69 A true crisis had been averted 
but the whole affair left a bitter taste in the mouths of all those involved. 
 The irony of this small dispute between the two largest Western Allies is that their 
conflicting demands were both motivated by the same general fear – that of another war, 
possibly involving long-range missiles, against the Soviet Union. In fact, Backfire was used as 
a reason to evacuate German rocket specialists from the region around Nordhausen (where 
rocket production had been moved after Peenemünde was bombed in August 1943), which 
was due to fall under Soviet occupation, to the relative safety of Cuxhaven, deep in the British 
zone.70 Britain and the US even considered demolishing the massive underground factory 
there and destroying all its contents to preclude them falling into Soviet hands, but decided 
that so doing might have ‘unfortunate repercussions’.71 For the time being, they even 
maintained a façade of friendly relations with the Soviets, who were invited to send 
representatives to the final Backfire test-firing on 15 October. However, Cameron was 
requested to, at his own discretion, ‘refrain from showing foreign or Press visitors any part of 
the equipment or records that you consider it advisable to conceal’.72 The Soviets, for their 
part, did little to foster a relationship of trust either – despite only being invited to send three 
observers to the test-firing, they actually sent six, meaning the three who were subsequently 
denied access by the British had to try and catch a glimpse of the launch from beyond the site 
perimeter.73 
 Certainly, this behaviour suggests that the Soviets viewed Backfire as an important 
exercise and one they felt they wanted to learn as much as possible about. Assessing the exact 
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value of the operation is one of the biggest challenges in studying Backfire, particularly as 
much of the literature on Britain’s missile development dismisses it as, for instance, ‘of little 
practical value’.74 However, at the time, the War Office and Ministry of Supply allotted it 
‘overriding priority over other guided missile projects in order to facilitate its early 
completion’.75 In pushing for this level of priority, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff made their case 
as follows: ‘It may be that the demands in respect of Backfire may cause some delay in work 
now being done in connection with Guided Projectiles generally. On the other hand the value 
to be obtained from Backfire may well lead to a shortening of the eventual time to be spent 
on Guided Projectile research, and in any case the duration of Backfire will be comparatively 
short.’76 However, despite this priority, not all parties in Britain were in support of Backfire – 
Colonel Terence Sanders, who had been sent to examine launch sites in northern France in 
early 1945, was of the view ‘that to assemble rockets from the components and then to 
launch them would be of doubtful value’ and the technical advisor sent by Alwyn Crow to act 
as Cameron’s right-hand man, had ‘no enthusiasm for the project at all’.77 
 After the launches, the immediate response to the operation was largely positive. In 
the conclusion to his official Backfire report, Cameron summarised thus: ‘It is believed that all 
is known and that it now remains for others to make use of that knowledge.’78 Those involved 
also celebrated the completion of a successful operation. Major P.A. Chittenden, who had 
served as Superintendent of Electrical and Electronic Assembly for SPOG, recorded details of 
a commemorative dinner held one week after the final launch and where dessert was the 
mysterious ‘A.4 Special’. He was also invited to attend lectures on the long-range rocket and 
screenings of the Backfire film, produced by a War Office film unit, and even received a 
‘Backfire trophy’ in the form of a metal V-2 on a wooden plinth.79 The German participants 
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had a similarly positive experience, though many of them saw Backfire as merely a 
bothersome delay to their real future in the United States. Dieter Huzel described the British 
treatment of him and his colleagues as ‘generous’, and commented that the extensive 
Backfire reports were ‘more comprehensive than anything that existed in German files’.80 
The British press also responded enthusiastically, with The Times, Daily Worker, Daily 
Express, and The Sphere all publishing reports on the test-firing, each accompanied by 
photographs of the V-2 taking off.81 The special correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, 
Edmund Townshend, attended the launch on 15 October and described the rocket as ‘like a 
pencil on a spear of flame as long as itself’.82 The Daily Mail reporter, meanwhile, emphasised 
how much had been learnt from the operation, asserting that ‘British scientists and army 
technicians have reached a point where, within three weeks, we could dispense with German 
help if we wished.’83 While it was true that Backfire had allowed the British authorities to 
amass a substantial wealth of knowledge about the design, assembly, preparation and launch 
of the V-2, this did not mean that the services of German specialists were no longer needed. 
In fact, looking ahead, German expertise was to be directly integrated into the post-war 
British missile programme. In terms of a final verdict on Operation Backfire, while its long-
term implications may have been relatively minor, its importance at the time was considered 
to be very high – a fact which is perhaps evidenced most clearly by the willingness of British 
officials to risk souring their relationship with the Americans just to ensure the retention of a 
few German experts for the duration of the operation. Ultimately, it met the terms of its 
limited mandate and laid the foundations for the guided missile research and development 
programme which emerged in Britain in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
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Looking to the Future 
When asked to prepare a report on the future developments in weapons and methods of war, 
Henry Tizard and his expert committee spent six months examining over 300 documents and 
interviewing over 100 witnesses. The resulting report was wide-ranging, fairly comprehensive 
and bold in many of its predictions. As noted above, it included the belief that long-range 
missiles would have an important role to play in future conflicts. But in one area, information 
was notable by its absence – atomic warfare. Published in June 1945, before the use of the 
atomic bomb against Japan and while the Manhattan Project remained a closely-guarded 
secret, the Tizard Committee were denied access to any atomic information.84 As a result, the 
best the Tizard Report could say in its section entitled ‘The Atomic Bomb’, was that ‘there is 
… a possibility that some practical method may be found to release atomic energy 
explosively’, and that, if so, ‘a single bomber could do an amount of damage equal to that of 
a thousand bombers using normal bombs’.85 Once the power of the atomic bomb had been 
revealed in August, it was decided that this predictive report was now distinctly out of date, 
so a new edition was deemed necessary. Tizard rejected the offer to make revisions, and the 
task was handed over to the Joint Technical Warfare Committee (JTWC) instead. 
 In the course of preparing the revised report, the JTWC received new information on 
the atomic bomb from Sir James Chadwick, the senior British officer on the Manhattan 
Project, and from Wallace Akers, the head of the parallel British development programme, 
codenamed ‘Tube Alloys’. Chadwick informed the Committee that the current method of 
delivering the atomic bomb by aircraft had limited longevity, given advances in anti-aircraft 
defence and the ability to destroy enemy airfields. However, he described a rocket, or ‘space 
projectile’, as the ‘ideal method of delivery for the atomic bomb’, on account of its greater 
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range, the difficulty of shooting it down, and the reduced vulnerability of its small, perhaps 
mobile, launch sites.86 Akers, meanwhile, warned that ‘the only protection against an atomic 
weapon is to prevent it arriving or to live and carry on all industry in bomb-proof shelters 
burrowed some hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of feet in the earth.’87 This echoed similar 
sentiments offered by others who were intimately aware of rocket development at this time. 
Even as early as November 1944, nine months before the bombing of Hiroshima, the ever-
prescient British scientific intelligence expert R.V. Jones had written that ‘a very long range 
rocket … by virtue of its relative immunity from interception … might be a feasible weapon 
for delivering a uranium bomb, should such a bomb become practicable.’88 Germany’s leading 
rocket pioneer, Wernher von Braun, also saw possibilities in ‘the harnessing of atomic energy 
together with the development of rockets, the consequence of which cannot yet be fully 
predicted, though he may well have been referring to the possibility of nuclear engines rather 
than payloads.’89 In the conclusion of his official Backfire report, Cameron agreed: ‘If the high 
explosive content of the warhead can be replaced by an atomic bomb, its destructive ability 
will be colossal.’90 It should be noted, however, that one of the main findings of Backfire was 
that a V-2 could not carry an atomic warhead, as the maximum V-2 payload was 2,150lbs, 
while the atomic bombs then available (that is, akin to those dropped on Japan) weighed at 
least 9,000lbs.91 As a result, the new JTWC report confirmed that rockets were likely to be the 
most effective method of atomic bombardment in the future but would not be ready for use 
for perhaps another ten years.92 Nonetheless, the principle remained sound.  
 Of course, all military planning is based on a certain set of assumptions about which 
nation is likely to be the future enemy – for Britain in this period, the Soviet Union was the 
obvious potential foe. Julian Lewis has argued that Britain responded to the post-war 
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breakdown in Anglo-Soviet relations with foresight, prudence and exceptional rapidity.93 In a 
sense, this is almost an understatement. A few days after the war in Europe ended, and while 
the Grand Alliance was still in effect, Churchill asked his planning staff to devise a strategy for 
defeating the Soviet Union in open conflict, codenamed ‘Operation Unthinkable’ – 
remarkably, it involved utilising 100,000 rearmed German soldiers, reinforced by British and 
American manpower and air support, to launch a pre-emptive strike on the war-weary Soviet 
Union.94 Later assessments suggested that the Soviet Union’s overwhelming superiority in 
conventional manpower could only be counteracted by the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, such as the atomic bomb.95 There was therefore a serious fear among British 
strategists about what would happen in the Soviets developed atomic weaponry of their own 
– in the JTWC report of July 1946, it was estimated that ‘some 30-120 atomic bombs 
accurately delivered by the USSR might cause the collapse of the United Kingdom’.96 
Unsurprisingly, this thinking directly influenced British missile development – the range 
requirements for a long-range rocket were given as 800, 1,500 and 1,850 miles, based on 
calculations of the distance of major cities in the Soviet Union from ‘Norwich, Nicosia in 
Cyprus, and Peshawar in India’, that is, the places in British territory ‘from which the best 
minimum range coverage is obtainable.’97 
The potentialities of rocketry discussed in this period were not limited solely to 
military applications. Cameron thought rockets might provide ‘a mail service which could 
bridge the Atlantic in 40 minutes [and which] might be of more value than a weapon of war’.98 
A Daily Mail article written in the wake of the Backfire launches speculated even more 
ambitiously – in a new form, the rocket ‘could supplant aircraft and carry mail, goods and 
perhaps passengers across the Atlantic in 15 minutes’. (This must have seemed particularly 
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enticing as it appeared alongside another article noting that Pan-American Airways’ re-
established New York-London service would take 15 hours!) The V-2 piece continued: 
‘German experts have ideas which seem to go into the realm of fantasy. They say that if the 
crews can make their own oxygen, there is no reason why the men in rockets should not travel 
beyond the power of gravitational attraction and anchor in the space between planets’, or 
even ‘reach the moon’.99 It is certainly true that individuals like von Braun, whose work in 
rocketry had initially been inspired by the notion of travelling beyond Earth’s atmosphere, 
had bold visions of what this new technology could achieve. In the report he prepared for 
CIOS after the war, he was certain that, ‘when the art of rockets is developed further, it will 
be possible to go to other planets, first of all the moon.’ He summarised his views (and those 
of many of his contemporaries, both German and British) in the following way: ‘We are 
convinced that a complete mastery of the art of rockets will change conditions in the world 
in much the same way as did the mastery of aeronautics and that this change will apply both 
to the civilian and the military aspects of their use.’100 
 As a result, rocketry remained a high-priority field in the British scientific and 
technological exploitation programme, which continued to grow and expand in the early post-
war period. The most important development in this respect is that Britain moved from 
merely removing equipment and investigating facilities to detaining, interrogating and even 
recruiting German scientists and technicians themselves. In July 1945, the Deputy Chiefs of 
Staff committee (which took the lead on this initiative) described German progress in a range 
of fields, including rocketry, and noted that ‘the related equipment will be transferred to this 
country but it needs, for its full exploitation, the presence of the scientists responsible for its 
development.’101 In August, the government Service departments were asked for subjects in 
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which they would be keen to recruit German experts – both the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production and the Ministry of Supply included missiles and guided projectiles on their lists.102 
In all cases, the individuals brought in would be vetted as to their political pasts, subject to 
various security measures, and only employed on a limited basis, by way of renewable six-
month contracts. 
Naturally, Backfire offered the ideal platform for the British to try and recruit German 
rocketry experts. Once the test-firings were completed and SPOG was disbanded, the Ministry 
of Supply took complete control of the facilities at Cuxhaven, which became known as 
Ministry of Supply Establishment, Cuxhaven, or MOSEC. Here, the German personnel were 
tasked with documenting their work to date on guided projectiles, but a report on MOSEC 
filed in December 1945 noted that ‘the purpose for this establishment, apart from general 
research, is to determine which German scientists it is considered could be taken for similar 
work in experimental stations in UK and to give practical experience to British scientists on 
German methods of guided projectiles.’ This process was handled disastrously. No 
information was provided to the German experts about future employment until March 1946 
when MOSEC was winding down. In addition, the British officials felt it was improper ‘to enter 
into a contract with a beaten enemy’.103 As a result, the contracts which were eventually 
offered were ungenerous and were judged by the German personnel to be utterly inadequate 
on two grounds: there was no clarity as to the nature of the work they would be doing in 
Britain, and there were no assurances about the fates of their families who would be left 
behind in Germany.104 
With the contracts rejected, the British informed the German specialists that they 
were forbidden to work anywhere in Germany due to demilitarisation restrictions and then 
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cut them adrift when MOSEC was shut down in May 1946. Most of the German experts then 
immediately approached the French who very quickly offered them all contracts which they 
were willing to accept.105 Panicked that, as a result of their miserly tactics, they were going to 
lose out on all these German experts, the British authorities tried to hold the engineers at 
another facility at Trauen while they tried to arrange a better offer.106 On 23 May, new 
contracts arrived from London, only for the German experts to discover the terms had not 
changed at all from the originals.107 Eventually, a solution was devised and ten German rocket 
engineers were brought to Britain in November 1946. Among their number was Walter ‘Papa’ 
Riedel, who had been head of the Design Office at Peenemünde, and Johannes Schmidt, the 
de facto leader of the group, who had spent the war working on submarines but had 
reinvented himself as a rocket expert in order to secure post-war employment.108 
 As this story shows, and as explored elsewhere in the article, one of the problems the 
British had to face was competition with their allies, both the Americans and the French. 
Throughout the summer of 1945, once the friendly but ultimately pragmatic wartime alliance 
broke down, relations became strained. The wrangling over the fate of the 27 rocket experts 
loaned to Backfire by the US authorities was just one example. At the same time, concerned 
that the greater financial, political and logistical power of the United States would give them 
a ‘blank cheque’ with regards to exploiting Germany, the Chiefs of Staff pushed for a fair 
allocation policy between the two nations on all secret weapons and technological 
equipment.109 Driven by the fact that they were taking the lead in the ongoing war against 
Japan, the US proposal was ‘to give preference to the Americans in all cases where there are 
insufficient samples, personnel or equipment available to provide for development to be 
continued simultaneously both in [Britain] and the United States.’ The British felt that it would 
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be better to have in place administrative machinery to decide which country was best-placed 
to exploit each specific field but acknowledged that this would be time-consuming and would 
give ‘further grounds to [US Army Chief of Staff] General Marshall in his complaint that we 
are not being co-operative in this matter.’110 As a result, the British signalled their assent on 
4 July, but they still held clear reservations: ‘We agree in principle, but consider it most 
important that the Americans should not be given carte blanche to remove equipment, 
scientific personnel and documents without consultation, and we must insist that records of 
anything removed to either country must be exchanged.’111 As for the French, they were only 
to receive an allocation when US and British demands had been met, and even then only if a 
direct request was received.112 
It is worth noting, however, that this inter-Allied rivalry was only genuinely fierce in 
the first year or so after the end of the war, when all the occupying powers were adjusting to 
new positions in the global order. In any case, British officials and policymakers remained all 
too aware that the real future enemy was the Soviet Union, and that a Soviet missile capability 
was of far greater significance to British interests than any small-scale competition with the 
US or France. As such, Britain took active measures to prevent German rocket equipment or 
expertise from falling into Soviet hands. This need was sharpened by Operation Osoaviakhim, 
the Soviets’ mass deportation of German scientific and technical workers from occupied 
Germany to the USSR, which they carried out in late October 1946.113 Partially in response to 
this drastic action, on 11 December, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, agreed that ‘it was necessary to deny to the Russians those 
German scientists and technicians, within our influence, who could contribute substantially 
to the building up of Russian war potential.’ Schemes were developed to facilitate this ‘denial 
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policy’ and they did have some successes. A team of six specialists who had worked during 
the war on V-weapon production at the Linke-Hofmann-Busch firm were evacuated from 
Berlin to Britain, which was believed to have seriously ‘affected Russian exploitation of 
German guided missile research.’114 Nonetheless, the resources available to the Soviet Union 
meant that these minor non-proliferation measures were likely to have only a limited 
effect.115 Indeed, the British authorities themselves concluded that while the denial of experts 
to the Soviet Union ‘may have delayed Russian developments, it has hardly prevented 
them’.116 
 While this was concerning to the British, their main drive with regard to German rocket 
expertise was to utilise it for their own ends, not to deny it to the Soviet Union. In Alwyn 
Crow’s October 1945 report to the JTWC, he stated his belief that British rocket technicians 
‘are equal and superior to those of USA, Russia and Germany. Given adequate facilities there 
is no reason to doubt that Britain could hold her own in the race for the development of these 
new weapons.’117 Sharing Crow’s optimism, the post-war British government decided to 
provide these ‘adequate facilities’ and ordered the creation of a Guided Projectiles 
Establishment (GPE) to be based at a former RAF aerodrome at Westcott, in 
Buckinghamshire.118 The Westcott facility opened in the summer of 1946, though it remained 
incomplete for some time thereafter. The first group of ten German rocket experts, including 
Riedel and Schmidt, arrived in November. The reactions from local people were not wholly 
warm. A petition sent to the local MP read: ‘we very strongly object to this move, which would 
almost certainly result in many Germans living in the district and being free to mix with our 
people’, and suggesting that they be housed ‘in some place where they would not be able to 
exercise what might be a harmful influence on village life’.119 Over time, opinions softened 
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and when, a year after they had arrived, an explosion at the GPE claimed the life of Johannes 
Schmidt (as well as two British personnel), there was an outpouring of grief in the area. The 
local newspaper even went as far as to say that the ‘poignancy [of the accident] was 
heightened by the fact that a great German scientist whose knowledge and skill were being 
applied to British research work was among the three who lost their lives.’120 Even so, trust in 
the German recruits was not complete, as revealed when it was discovered in 1947 that 
caches of technical documents pertaining to rocketry had been hidden in Germany during the 
final days of the Third Reich, perhaps with a view to secretly recreating a missile programme 
in Germany after the war. Under the so-called Project Abstract, German rocketeers now in 
British or American employ were interrogated about these illicit stashes, and a spirit of 
suspicion returned to relations between the experts and their new employers, albeit 
briefly.121 
The work that was conducted at Westcott, and to which the German experts directly 
contributed, was dictated by the priorities of the Service departments. In early 1947, on the 
list discussed by the Guided Weapons Advisory Committee (GWAC), one of the ‘Priority A’ 
items was a ‘strategical rocket’ codenamed ‘Menace’, in which the General Staff, the Air Staff 
and the Naval Staff were all interested. The criteria for this weapon included suitability for 
launching from any part of the world, ‘ranges 400 to 2,000 miles approx. but maximum ranges 
of 800 to 1,500 miles of operational value’, and ‘Destructive [i.e. high explosive] and “Carrier” 
[i.e. atomic or biological] warheads required.’ It also needed to have a ‘50% zone of 2 miles 
at all ranges’, meaning that half of all rockets fired should land within two miles of the exact 
target.122 In addition, long-range rockets seemed a smart investment as they could act as a 
deterrent, thus minimising the chances of war and reducing the need for Britain to maintain 
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a large and costly conventional army in a period of economic, not to mention geopolitical, 
decline.123 However, even at this point, there were concerns that the development work 
involved in such a weapon was also prohibitively expensive for cash-strapped post-war 
Britain, not least because the technology needed considerable improvement before it could 
serve as the main form of long-range bombardment. In autumn 1947, the GWAC 
recommended that, ‘at the present time, the method to be adopted for long-range 
bombardment must be the manned subsonic bomber.’124 In 1948, the Ministry of Supply took 
the decision to curtail research into a long-range strategic missile and focus efforts instead on 
jet-powered manned bombers and anti-aircraft projectiles instead.125 It was 1955 before 
Britain decided to pursue a long-range rocketry programme again, when it began work on the 
ultimately abortive Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile.126 Britain’s first entry into the 




To conclude, it seems appropriate to return to the three objectives set out in the introduction 
of this article. The first objective was to challenge the idea that Britain showed no serious 
interest in developing a ballistic missile programme immediately after the Second World War, 
and that Operation Backfire was a largely pointless exercise. It is true that Britain’s early foray 
into rocketry was a brief one but the potential of the V-2 meant that initial enthusiasm was 
high, fuelling notions that the long-range rocket would promptly eclipse the manned bomber 
and that Britain had the resources to be a vigorous competitor in the post-war missile race.127 
It was only later that these proved to be misconceptions and re-evaluations of priorities were 
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necessarily made. Backfire, however, was embarked upon amid this atmosphere of post-war 
rocket fervour. In the conclusion to his operation report, Major-General Cameron, no stranger 
to the subject, wrote that, ‘for the sake of their very existence, Britain and the United States 
must be masters of this weapon of the future.’128 This sentiment just goes to show that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, not only did Britain embrace the potential of 
ballistic missiles but it also saw itself as able to participate fully in research and development 
in this field moving forward. Moreover, the subsequent abandonment of the British missile 
programme in 1948 does not diminish the importance of Backfire – in fact, the realisation that 
a rocket similar to the V-2 was not capable of delivering an atomic warhead was one of the 
operation’s key findings, thus allowing the British to commit their scant resources to the 
development of jet bombers, an ultimately far more fruitful endeavour.129 
 The second objective was to locate German expertise in the story of British missile 
development. There can be little doubt that Britain, with its almost complete lack of wartime 
long-range rocket research, needed to rely heavily on German advances in creating a post-
war missile programme. As Alwyn Crow reported to the JTWC in October 1945, ‘the weapons 
V-1 and V-2 which Germany has produced represent considerable technical achievement, far 
beyond anything for which facilities and money have been made available in this country. 
These weapons have been developed with striking imagination … [and] with drive and 
initiative.’130 As such, the recruitment of German personnel was of great value – in 1949, it 
was noted that ‘the Guided Weapons fields in which the Germans were so far ahead of us at 
the end of the war have been particularly carefully combed … The result of this careful 
combing is that approximately one third of our present 90 German scientists are working for 
us directly on guided weapon problems and a fair proportion of the remainder are on related 
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work.’131 The other side of the story here was the fear that the German expertise sought by 
the British might prove equally as useful to the Soviet Union. In May 1946, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee stated its anxious belief that ‘the alliance of German brainpower and 
Russian resources may well prove to be the most important outcome of the occupation of 
Germany.’132 Every German rocket engineer employed in Britain was one fewer who could 
fall into Soviet hands, making the German involvement in the British missile programme 
doubly important. 
 Finally, the third objective was to show that Britain and the United States did not 
always present a united front in the immediate post-war years, and that the changing global 
power dynamics involved in this reconfiguration of the Anglo-American alliance led to 
competition as much as co-operation. The wrangling over the group of 27 German missile 
experts which took place during Backfire was was one particularly glaring manifestation of 
this. Nonetheless, this transatlantic animosity could not last, especially under the shadow of 
the looming Soviet threat. In September 1948, when the Guided Weapons Advisory 
Committee concluded that pursuing a long-range rocket programme was beyond British 
resources, they noted ‘that intensive work is in progress in the USA’ and therefore 
recommended ‘that the closest co-operation be maintained with the USA in the development 
problems associated with long range rocket bombardment’, perhaps as ‘the first steps to the 
realisation of a common policy on bombardment weapon development between the UK and 
USA.’133 This suggestion became a reality with the bilateral military-technological sharing 
arrangements of the Burns-Templer Agreement in 1948, and the Sandys-Wilson Agreement 
of 1954, which led to a joint Anglo-American missile programme.134 To this day, the British 
nuclear deterrent relies on Trident missiles which were developed, and are still 
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manufactured, in the United States.135 In many ways, the origins of this state of affairs can be 
traced back to that first V-2 impact in Chiswick in September 1944, and the British attempts 
to understand ‘the other end of a trajectory’ which followed a year later.136 
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